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and providing remedies for fraud in the sale of stocks and bonds.
Texas has two major statutes to combat securities fraud: The Texas
Securities Act (TSA) and the Texas Stock Fraud Act (TSFA). Since the
legislature modeled the fraud provisions of the TSA on the federal stat-
utes,2 Texas courts use federal decisions under the federal statutes to in-
terpret the TSA's similar language.3 This Article, therefore, includes the
Fifth Circuit cases involving state law and securities fraud under federal
law. The author does not intend for this Article to exhaust all aspects of
securities regulation but rather to update the Texas-based securities prac-
titioner on new developments of interest.
I. COVERAGE OF THE SECURITIES ACTS
The definitions (especially those relating to what constitutes a security
or a stock and the persons liable) as well as federal preclusion of state
securities fraud actions determine the fraudulent transactions subject to
the state's securities acts. Texas courts have begun to consider whether
equity interests in limited liability companies (LLCs) are securities under
the TSA and constitute stock under the TSFA. Texas courts were also
confronted with some interesting secondary liability situations. The Fifth
Circuit determined that the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act
(SLUSA) 4 did not preclude a class action under the TSA for fraud in
connection with the sale of certificates of deposits.
A. THE STOCK AND SECURITY DEFINITIONS
FOR LLC EQUITY INTERESTS
The TSA applies to "securities." For many questionable contracts, most
courts follow the Fifth Circuit's economic-realities-of-the-parties'-rela-
1. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-1 (West 2012); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 27.01 (West 2012). The TSFA is embedded in a statute that also covers real estate
fraud, so many of the cases dealing with TSFA's statutory fraud deal with real estate. See
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01.
2. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33 cmt. (West 2010) (comment to 1977
amendment).
3. See, e.g., Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P. v. Ryder Scott Co., No. 01-10-00362-CV,
2012 WL 1136607 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 5, 2012), withdrawn, 402 S.W.3d
719, 741 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (discussed below, see infra notes
27-45 and accompanying text); Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int'l, Inc. v. Haskell, 193 S.W.3d
87, 102 n.13 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).
4. See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1)(A) (2012).
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tionship test5 with respect to investment contracts-defined as "securi-
ties"6-to determine whether the investor was passive (relied on the
promoter to achieve a profit), in which case the interest is a security, or
active (participated in management), in which case the interest is not a
security.7 In Affco Investments 2001, L.L.C. v. Proskauer Rose, L.L.P.,8
the Fifth Circuit applied this test to an equity interest in an LLC for the
federal securities laws. Affco Investments involved the sale of a hedged
tax shelter scheme marketed by an accounting firm on the basis of legal
opinions by unnamed national law firms and with one leg of the hedge in
the LLC purchased by the investors. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
subsequently disallowed the scheme's tax benefits. Before the investors
filed their tax returns, the IRS issued notices of certain prohibited trans-
actions. One of the national law firms issued an opinion, requested by the
investors, that the scheme did not resemble the prohibited transactions.
Consequently, the investors did not avail themselves of tax reporting pro-
cedures that would have enabled them to qualify for amnesty on the
scheme. Suffering losses in back taxes, interest, and penalties, the inves-
tors sued the law firm for violation of the Racketeering Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)9 and federal securities laws, as well
as secondary liability (both aider and abettor liability and control person
liability) under the TSA.1o The trial court dismissed the RICO claim be-
cause it was barred by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
(PSLRA)11 and the securities claims for failure to sufficiently plead reli-
ance and scienter, and the trial court also refused to exercise supplemen-
tal jurisdiction over the TSA claims. 12 The Fifth Circuit affirmed.' 3
With respect to the "securities" issue, the PSLRA bars civil RICO
claims based on fraud in the purchase or sale of securities. 14 The investors
claimed that the LLC equity interests did not constitute securities. How-
ever, the investors, many of who were the only members of the respective
LLC, did not manage the LLC but had agreements with various invest-
5. See Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 418, 422-23 (5th Cir. 1981) (determining
that a passive partnership interest was an investment contract and hence a security).
6. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1).
7. See United States v. Leonard, 529 F.3d 83, 91 (2nd Cir. 2008) (finding that the LLC
interests in the case were securities).
8. Affco Invs. 2001, L.L.C. v. Proskauer Rose, L.L.P., 625 F.3d 185, 191 (5th Cir.
2010).
9. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a), 1964(c) (2012).
10. The investors also sued the accounting firm under Rule 10b-5 and obtained a set-
tlement. See Affco Invs. 2001, L.L.C., 625 F.3d at 189; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).
The investors also sued the law firm under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act
(TDTPA). See Brief of Proskauer Rose LLP in Support of Motion to Dismiss First
Amended Complaint at 21, Affco Invs., LLC v. Proskauer Rose, LLP, 625 F.3d 185 (5th
Cir. 2010) (No. 09-20734), 2009 WL 954785; see also George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regu-
lation, 59 SMU L. REV. 1541, 1555 n.94 (2006) (discussing the applicability of the TDTPA
to investment advice). Although the TDTPA applies to most services, there is an exception
for professional services. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE Am. § 17.49(c) (West 2012).
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1, 78u-4.
12. Affco Invs. 2001, L.L.C., 625 F.3d at 189.
13. Id. at 196.
14. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
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ment and brokerage firms for that management. So, under the Fifth Cir-
cuit's economic-realities-of-the-parties'-relationship test and its previous
finding that tax benefits are "profit" for determining the presence of an
investment contract,15 the investors were passive. Consequently, these
LLC equity interests constituted "investment contracts," defined as "se-
curities." 16 The reliance and scienter issues in Affco Investments are dis-
cussed below.17
In contrast to the TSA, the TSFA applies to "stock" in a corporation or
a joint stock company, not a "security." 18 An LLC is not a corporation1 9
or a joint stock company. 20 However, the equity interest may take the
form of stock. The principal parties in Allen v. Devon Energy Holdings,
LLC,2 1 an opinion discussed below, 22 did not raise this issue, although
the LLC did mention the issue in a footnote to its brief.2 3 Accordingly,
the Houston First District Court of Appeals, without addressing the ap-
plicability of the TSFA, applied the TSFA to the equity interest in the
LLC involved in the opinion.
B. PERSONs LIABLE
The ease of becoming judgment proof in Texas with liberal exemptions
from execution of judgment makes secondary liability very important.
The Texas statutes provide for several vicarious liability theories, includ-
ing aiding and abetting liability and control person liability. Since federal
securities law does not allow a private investor to recover against aiders
and abettors, 24 aiding and abetting has become a significant aspect of
state securities law. The elements of an aider and abettor claim under the
TSA are: (1) a primary violation, (2) the aider's general awareness of the
violation, (3) the aider's substantial assistance, and (4) the aider acted
15. See Long v. Shultz Cattle Co., 881 F.2d 129, 132 n.2 (5th Cir. 1989) (discussing an
action involving a cattle feeding program).
16. Affco Invs. 2001, L.L.C, 625 F.3d at 189-91.
17. See infra notes 141-45 and accompanying text. To uphold summary judgment for
the fraud claim, the court need only find one element missing. Since the Fifth Circuit found
reliance missing, it did not consider the scienter pleading.
18. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01(a) (West 2012) ("involving real estate
or stock in a corporation or joint stock company").
19. Compare TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 1.002(14) (West 2012) (defining a corpo-
ration), with id. § 1.002(46) (defining a limited liability company).
20. Compare Flint v. Culbertson, 319 S.W.2d 690, 693-94 (Tex. 1958) (holding owners
of a joint stock company jointly and severally liable for the debts of the company), with
TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.114 (stating that owners of a limited liability company
are not liable for the debts of the company).
21. Allen v. Devon Energy Holdings, L.L.C., 367 S.W.3d 355 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 2012, pet. granted, judgm't vacated w.r.m.).
22. See infra notes 98-137 and accompanying text.
23. See Brief for Appellee Devon Energy Production Co., L.P. at 15 n.5, Allen v.
Devon Energy Holdings, L.L.C., 367 S.W.3d 355 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2012,
pet. granted, judgm't vacated w.r.m.) (No. 01-09-00643-CV), 2010 WL 780953 (asserting
that Appellant has no standing to sue under the TSFA).




with intent or reckless disregard of the truth. 5 The second TSA secon-
dary liability principle deals with persons in control of the primary viola-
tor. Control person liability under the TSA has two elements: the
controlling person had (1) actual power over the controlled person and
(2) the power to control the specific action that gave rise to the primary
violation.26 Of the three appellate opinions dealing with secondary liabil-
ity, two used both the aiding and abetting principles as well as control
person principles to hold a perpetrator liable.
1. Aider and Abettor Liability of Subsequent Investors
The investors in the first opinion, Highland Capital Management, L.P.
v. Ryder Scott Co., 2 7 purchased the issuer's publicly registered unsecured
senior notes from 1999 to 2000 and again in 2002 based on representa-
tions of the issuer's oil and gas reserves contained in its prospectus and in
subsequent annual reports to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). The reports were based on information prepared by one of the
aiders and abettors, a petroleum engineering firm, without following SEC
rules for calculating those reserves. 28 The senior notes prohibited senior
secured indebtedness greater than 30% of the reserves. In 2001, the issuer
sold secured notes to the second aider and abettor, an independent oil
and gas producer. In late 2002, the petroleum engineering firm revised
the reserves downward, the issuer became no longer able to pay the inter-
est on the senior notes, and the investors forced an involuntary liquida-
tion bankruptcy proceeding under which they recovered less than two
cents on the dollar. 29 To recoup their losses, the investors sued the petro-
leum engineering firm for producing fraudulent reserve estimates and the
holder of the secured notes for knowing of the fraud and causing the
investors' loss, all as aiders and abettors of the bankrupt issuer's fraud.30
25. See Darocy v. Abildtrup, 345 S.W.3d 129, 138-39 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2011, no
pet.) (discussed below, see infra notes 46-50 and accompanying text); see also TEx. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33, § F(2) (West 2012); Sterling Trust Co. v. Adderley, 168 S.W.3d
835, 841-42 (Tex. 2005) (adding the general awareness element); Flint, supra note 10, at
1550-53 (discussing Sterling Trust Co.).
26. See Abbott v. Equity Group, Inc., 2 F.3d 613, 620 (5th Cir. 1993) (laying out the
two-pronged test for federal securities law). Texas follows federal law in interpreting this
provision of the TSA.
27. Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P. v. Ryder Scott Co., No. 01-10-00362-CV, 2012 WL
1136607 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 5, 2012), withdrawn, 402 S.W.3d 719 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.). The investors also alleged common law fraud,
negligent misrepresentation, conspiracy, and aiding and abetting fraud. Highland Capital
Mgmt., L.P., 402 S.W.3d at 723.
28. The rule limits unproven reserves to those drilling units offsetting productive units
reasonably certain of production when drilled. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.4-10(a)(31)(i) (2012).
29. For bankruptcy proceedings of the issuer, see In re Seven Seas Petroleum, Inc., 522
F.3d 575 (5th Cir. 2008) (where an independent oil producer, as a secured creditor, at-
tempted to have an investor's state claims discharged in bankruptcy).
30. In the federal court system, the Fifth Circuit takes a dim view of secured debt
holders who use their position to gain at the expense of the less secured. See In re E. A.
Fretz Co., 565 F.2d 366, 369-71 (5th Cir. 1978) (where the court favored a second secured
party when the first secured party bought up unsecured debt at a deep discount, raising
such unsecured debt to first secured status to the second secured party's detriment).
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The trial court granted a no-ground summary judgment.3' The appellate
court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. 32
To support the defensive summary judgment, the Houston First District
Court of Appeals in Highland Capital Management only needed to find
one of the elements of the investor' case nullified.33 The independent oil
producer successfully focused on the element of its awareness of the vio-
lation, relying on affidavits of its chief financial officer, executive vice
president of exploration, and a director shared with the issuer, each of
whom was properly coached34 to swear that they had no knowledge of
any of the mistakes or irregularities in the reserve report from the petro-
leum engineering firm. The investors' first piece of controverting evi-
dence consisted of a deposition of the chief financial officer indicating the
absence of a due diligence effort in creating the reserve report prior to
purchasing the secured notes, and an affidavit of a registered petroleum
engineer, an examination of which would have shown it violated SEC
rules and used improper engineering techniques (because it used gravity
segregation with counterflow without years of continuous production).
The investors' second piece of controverting evidence was the common
director of both the issuer (when it discovered a massive gas cap that
would severely reduce reserves) and later of the aider and abettor. The
investors provided no evidence that the issuer's board discussed the mat-
ter or that the director was privy to such discussions. Unfortunately for
the investors, the Texas Supreme Court has ruled that the general aware-
ness requirement under the TSA is subjective, not objective (should have
known),35 So the investors' controverting evidence failed to defeat sum-
mary judgment with respect to the independent oil producer.36
The interesting aspect of the opinion lay in the investors' attempt to
expand aider and abettor liability through the general awareness princi-
ple. Other opinions indicate that lending money to a fraudster, enabling
the fraudster to hide or perpetuate the fraudster's scheme, amounts to
aiding and abetting.37 The Highland Capital Management investors tried
to expand this to "should have known." Fortunately, the court of appeals
preserved the defense to an aiding and abetting claim when the innocent
31. Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P., 402 S.W.3d at 725-26.
32. Id. at 748.
33. See Cathey v. Booth, 900 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1995).
34. The Texas Supreme Court's test for the admissibility of a self-serving affidavit in
support of summary judgment requires that the affidavit "is clear, positive, direct, other-
wise credible, free from contradictions and inconsistencies, and could have been readily
controverted" by opposing evidence. See Trico Techs. Corp. v. Montiel, 949 S.W.2d 308,
310 (Tex. 1997).
35. See Sterling Trust Co. v. Adderley, 168 S.W.3d 835, 841-42 (Tex. 2005); see also
Flint, supra note 10, at 1550-53 (discussing Sterling Trust Co.).
36. Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P. v. Ryder Scott Co., 402 S.W.3d 719, 738-39 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.).
37. See Goldstein v. Mortenson, 113 S.W.3d 769, 777 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, no
pet.) (where a broker aided the acquisition of a loan to cover known losses between inves-
tors' reported funds and funds available); see also K & S P'ship v. Continental Bank, N.A.,
952 F.2d 971, 977 (8th Cir. 1991).
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subsequent investor did not actually know of the fraudulent scheme.38
2. Aider and Abettor Liability of a Petroleum Report Preparer
The Highland Capital Management investors claimed the petroleum en-
gineering firm aided both the public brokers who sold the bonds to the
investors and the issuer in perpetrating the fraud. With respect to the
brokers, the petroleum engineering firm focused on whether unidentified
persons could be "sellers" for aiding and abetting liability purposes since
selling requires privity.39 Although the TSA does not define "sellers,"
and no Texas case has dealt with the issue, the appellate court ruled that
"sellers" include brokers since the comments to the TSA say the term
"sellers" includes brokers,40 and federal law, followed by Texas courts in
interpreting the TSA, similarly includes brokers within the term "sell-
ers."4 1 With respect to the issuer, the petroleum engineering firm asserted
that it did not render substantial assistance since cautionary language in
the prospectus rendered the issuer's misstatements immaterial, and that it
did not act recklessly since it believed its reserve report complied with
SEC requirements and industry standards. The first assertion failed to
support summary judgment because the prospectus intermingled the cau-
tionary language with misstatements regarding following SEC rules and
industry standards. The intermingled statements raised a fact issue con-
cerning whether the cautionary language would satisfy the test for imma-
teriality, namely negating the capacity of the misleading statement on oil
reserves to influence a reasonable investor.42 The second assertion also
failed since the trial court erroneously excluded a copy of the SEC rules
as hearsay. The rules might have refuted the petroleum engineering firm's
contention that it believed it had followed the SEC rules. Accordingly,
the investors still had the TSA claims for aiding and abetting against the
petroleum engineering firm.43
The disturbing aspect of the Highland Capital Management case con-
cerns the inability of the SEC, in examining the registration statement for
the public sale of the unsecured notes, to fathom a petroleum report pre-
pared contrary to its rules. The upshot of that inability means an investor
needs to do its own due diligence (which these investors claimed would
have revealed the problem) even for a public offering. It is no wonder
that Congress now permits the selling of securities through private place-
ments with advertising to accredited investors and through registered
38. Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P., 402 S.W.3d at 738-39.
39. See Frank v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 11 S.W.3d 380, 383 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).
40. See TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33 cmt. (West 2012) (comment to 1977
amendment).
41. Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P., 402 S.W.3d at 741-42; see also Pinter v. Dahl, 486
U.S. 622, 646-47 (1988).
42. Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P., 402 S.W.3d at 745; see also Va. Bankshares, Inc. v.
Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1097-98 (1991).
43. Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P., 402 S.W.3d at 748.
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brokers or funded portals to small investors." There is no difference in
the reliability of the information contained in a registered transaction and
an unregistered transaction. The small investor will become ever more
dependent on state law fraud remedies.4 5
3. Aiding and Abetting and Control Person Liability for an Issuer's
Secretary/Treasurer/Director
The second aider and abettor opinion, Darocy v. Abildtrup,46 involved
an oil and gas scam.47 The scammers organized a corporation to sell and
promote four oil and gas joint ventures, raised $8 million, and spent $2.3
million of that investment on Louisiana casinos, gentlemen's clubs, jewel-
44. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 201 (adding 15
U.S.C. § 77d(b) (2012) and directing the SEC to amend 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.502(c), 230.506
(2012) to allow general advertising in sales to accredited investors), 302 (adding a new
exemption for sales by registered brokers and registered funded portals in the aggregate
annual amount less than $1 million to small investors provided the investment is no more
than the greater of $2,000 or 5% of the annual income or net assets for investors with
annual income or net assets less than $100,000 and no more than 10% for investors with
more than $100,000), 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
45. Protection by state registration will be unavailable because Congress preempted
state registration for sales to small investors under the new exemption. See id. § 305
(amending 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b) to provide that the new exemption is a covered security
exempt from state registration).
46. Darocy v. Abildtrup, 345 S.W.3d 129, 132-35 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2011, no pet.).
47. Regulatory bodies are gravely concerned about oil and gas scams. See, e.g., Press
Release, Tex. State Sec. Board, State Sec. Regulator Warns Against Slippery Oil Deals Oil
Patch Scams Remain Favored Ploy to Fleece Investors (Jan. 11, 2007) (describing schemes
of out of state limited partnerships selling to other state's residents to reduce the likelihood
of discovery of the absence of substance and high pressure boiler room and internet sales;
recommending an informational procedure for prospective investors to follow to reduce
the possibility of being scammed). The SEC also has a warning to investors dealing with oil
and gas scams. See Oil and Gas Scams: Common Red Flags and Steps You Can Take to
Protect Yourself, SEC http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/oilandgasscams.htm (last visited
July 22, 2012) (pointing out the red flags of (1) sales pitches focused on highly publicized
news, (2) "can't miss" wells, (3) unsolicited materials, (4) limited opportunities, (5) high
rates of return, and (6) tips or secrets; recommending that prospective investors (1) ask
questions and check out the answers, (2) contact state oil and gas regulatory agencies [for
Texas, the railroad commission], (3) research the company, and (4) know the sales person).
The Texas State Securities Board criminally prosecutes oil and gas scammers. See Hays
v. State, 370 S.W.3d 775 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2012, no pet.); see also Press Release, Tex.
State Sec. Bd., North Texas Man Sentenced to 25 Years in Oil Field Scam (Apr. 26, 2011),
available at http://www.ssb.state.tx.us/News/Press_Release/04-26.11-press.php). In Hays,
the scammers sold two drilling joint ventures to investors, raised $2.5 million from 40 inves-
tors, drilled no wells, and spent only $400,000 on legitimate drilling expenses, spending the
rest on personal expenses and salaries. Hays, 370 S.W.3d at 777-80. For the first well, the
scammers hired a drilling company that sent equipment but left when it was not paid the
down payment. For the second well, the scammers failed to inform the investors that funds
invested by previous investors were spent on non-drilling activities and that the scammers
had breached the contract with the drilling company by non-payment. See TEx. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 581-29C, §§ (3), (4)(C) (West 2012) (stating that it is a first degree felony
to omit material information in the sale of a security if the amount involves more than
$100,000). The defendant, the first of five scammers tried, challenged the sufficiency of the
evidence. For the omitted breached contract and the omitted use of funds, investor testi-
mony that it would have affected their investment decision (which supported materiality
and the defendant's statements), leading the investors to believe drilling was imminent,




ers, cleaners, and retail stores not normally associated with business sup-
plies (including liquor stores). When the receiver took over the selling
corporation, only one well was completed and another drilled. The oil
and gas leases ultimately expired due to lack of operations and the entire
investment was lost. The investors sued the corporation, its former chief
executive officer (both of whom settled for a total of $12 million plus
$0.75 million in legal fees), and the corporation's secretary/treasurer/di-
rector as an aider and abettor and a control person under the TSA. The
secretary/treasurer/director had opened the issuer's bank account, was
one of two people needed to sign checks over $1,000, was responsible for
the IRS Forms K-1 for the investors, which he never delivered when re-
quested, and fielded supplier inquiries about payables and wasteful
spending. The trial court entered a judgment against the secretary for $1.5
million.48 The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed. 49
Conceding the primary violation by the issuer, the secretary/treasurer/
director challenged the sufficiency of the judgment, contending he was
nothing more than a marketing and salesperson and assumed the title of
secretary/treasurer/director in name only. With respect to the four ele-
ments of aider and abettor liability, the concession proved the primary
violation, the supplier inquiries proved general awareness, control of the
bank accounts proved substantial assistance, and failure to respond to in-
vestor inquiries proved intent to deceive.50
In addition to suing the secretary/treasurer/director of the issuer with
aiding and abetting liability, the Darocy investors also sued the officer as
a control person. Because the officer conceded the primary liability of his
corporation with respect to control person liability, the court of appeals
applied the federal two-prong test for "control" because Texas courts
generally use federal principles to interpret the TSA.51 That test requires
exercised control of general operations and the power to control the spe-
cific transaction, and both elements were satisfied by the secretary/trea-
surer/director's actions on behalf of the corporation.52
4. Aider and Abettor and Control Person Liability of a Brokerage
Firm for its Employee
The disgruntled investor in Fernea v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner &
Smith, Inc.53 had purchased stock from a brokerage firm employee in
companies owned by the employee outside of his brokerage firm's busi-
48. Darocy, 345 S.W.3d at 136.
49. Id. at 139.
50. Id. at 138-39.
51. See, e.g., Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P. v. Ryder Scott Co., 402 S.W.3d 719, 741
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.).
52. See Abbott v. Equity Group, Inc., 2 F.3d 613, 620 (5th Cir. 1993).
53. Fernea v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 03-09-00566-CV, 2011
WL 2769838 (Tex. App.-Austin July 12, 2011, no pet.) (opinion by C.J. Jones), appeal
abated, 2011 WL 4424291 (Tex. App.-Austin Sept. 23, 2011, no pet.) (pending settlement
in related case). The author served with C.J. J. Woodfin Jones as a director of the Univer-
sity of Texas Law School's Legal Research Board in 1975.
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ness. The investor was not a client of the brokerage firm. The brokerage
firm's employee manual included a policy, consistent with brokerage as-
sociation rules, that employees could not engage in outside securities
transactions without the brokerage firm's. permission. The omissions to
induce the investor into the business included failure to disclose that the
employee was not registered with the Texas State Securities Board
(Board), was subject to consumer-protection litigation brought by the
Texas Attorney General, and attempted to resell the same stock to
others. The investor sued the brokerage firm, among others, for damages
and rescission. Discovery revealed a reprimand letter from the brokerage
firm to the employee regarding his failure to accurately report his outside
activities but foregoing further discipline because the employee had de-
cided to sell the outside interests. Depositions similarly revealed that the
employee's superiors only knew that the sale would or had occurred. The
brokerage firm moved for summary judgment, which the trial court
granted and severed from the suits against the others.54 The Austin Court
of Appeals affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part.55
With respect to the aider and abettor claim, the Fernea court focused
on the general awareness element. The evidence of knowledge of the sale
failed to satisfy the general awareness requirement since the brokerage
firm lacked any knowledge of the violation of omitting disclosure of vari-
ous information.56
With respect to control person liability, the Fernea court focused on the
power to control the specific action. The brokerage firm argued that it did
not have the power to control the employee outside of the brokerage
The other issues involved in the opinion dealt with negligence in supervising the employee,
negligence for allowing an employee to violate internal policies of the brokerage firm, and
violation of several National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) rules. For the securities regulation matter of an implied cause of
action for violation of NASD and NYSE rules, the court quickly affirmed the dismissal
because the overwhelming case law rejects the inference of a private cause of action for
such a violation. Id. at *3-5.
The violated rules were NASD rules 3030 and 3040, and NYSE rule 346. See Appellant's
Brief at 11-13, Fernea v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 03-09-00566-CV,
2011 WL 2769838 (Tex. App.-Austin July 12, 2011, no pet.), appeal abated, 2011 WL
4424291 (Tex. App.-Austin Sept. 23, 2011, no pet.), 2010 WL 1604894, at *11-16. NASD
rule 3030 requires the employee to give written notice to the brokerage firm of outside
business activities, while rule 3040 requires the employee to give written notice to the bro-
kerage firm of outside securities transactions and its compensation after which the broker-
age firm disapproves or approves and supervises. See NASD Manual, Rule 3020, 3040.
NYSE rule 346 similarly requires the employee to give written notice to the brokerage firm
and receive written approval before engaging in outside business activities. See, e.g., Rich-
ard Foerster Reynolds, Former Registered Representative, Hearing Board Decision 09-
NYSE-04, 2009 WL 961140 (Mar. 10, 2009). These rules have subsequently been sup-
planted. See NYSE Regulation, Exchange Act Release No. 34-64131 (Mar. 28, 2011);
NASD Regulation, Exchange Act Release No. 34-62762 (Aug. 23, 2010).
54. Fernea, 2011 WL 2769838, at *1. On February 11, 2011, the investor obtained a
judgment for $1.6 million against the employee. See Chuck Lindell, Jury Awards $1.6 Mil-
lion in Business Fraud Suit, AUSTIN-AM. STATESMAN (Feb. 11, 2011, 9:22 PM), www.states
man.com/news/business/jury-awards-16-million-in-business-fraud-suit/nRXWh/.
55. Fernea, 2011 WL 2769838, at *18.
56. Id. at *13-15.
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firm's business. The Fernea court determined this was a fact issue not
conclusively proven for summary judgment.57 One method of control is
by contract,58 and the employee manual provision relating to outside se-
curities transactions was a contractual obligation of the employee's
employment.59
In 2005, the Texas Supreme Court limited aider and abettor liability by
adding a general awareness of the violation requirement that necessitates
actual subjective knowledge, not objective should-have-known knowl-
edge. 60 The corresponding element for control person liability is an af-
firmative defense that the control person neither knew nor, through
reasonable care, could know of the facts of the violation 6 1-a less protec-
tive requirement that changes the burden of proof and does not require a
subjective standard. The Fernea court went on to make a few gratuitous
remarks about the control person's affirmative defense, which was not
asserted by the brokerage firm for summary judgment. 62 The Fernea
court suggested that the lack of written notice required under the firm's
employment policy would not suffice. The impact of the Fernea case is an
increase in control person liability6 3 merely because the brokerage firm
has an employee policy concerning outside activities that the employee is
free to breach at any time. Brokerage firms, absent a method of detecting
employees likely to breach the employment policy, will remain exposed
to control liability under the TSA until the Texas Supreme Court simi-
larly reins in this expansion. Control person liability was designed for
control of artificial entities, not free-will individuals. That is the reason
vicarious liability in tort law requires an employee's tortious action to
benefit the employer, which was clearly absent for the broker in the
opinion.
C. PRECLUSION OF THE TSA FOR FRAUD IN CONNECTION
WITH UNCOVERED SECURITIES
The SLUSA precludes" state law for class actions of over fifty inves-
tors for misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in connection
57. Id. at *16.
58. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33 cmt. (West 2012) (comment to 1977
amendment).
59. Fernea, 2011 WL 2769838, at *17.
60. See Sterling Trust Co. v. Adderley, 168 S.W.3d 835, 841-42 (Tex. 2005) (adding the
general awareness element); see also George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 57 SMU
L. REV. 1207, 1210-11 (2004) (discussing Sterling Trust Co.).
61. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33F, § (1).
62. See Appellee's Brief at 24, Fernea v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
2011 WL 2769838 (Tex. App.-Austin July 12, 2011, no pet.), appeal abated, 2011 WL
4424291 (Tex. App.-Austin Sept. 23, 2011, no pet.), 2010 WL 2278493, at *24.
63. Prior brokerage cases dealing with errant employees found no control person lia-
bility. See Barnes v. SWS Fin. Servs., Inc., 97 S.W.3d 759, 764-65 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003,
no pet.); see also Hauser v. Farrell, 14 F.3d 1338, 1342-43 (9th Cir. 1994).
64. The Fifth Circuit prefers to refer to the SLUSA preemption as preclusion on the
basis of a meaningless distinction, see Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503, 507 n.1 (5th Cir.
2012) (referencing two United States Supreme Court cases: one referring to preemption
and the other preclusion, because the SLUSA allegedly does not replace the precluded
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with a sale or purchase of "covered securities," thereby narrowing the
scope of the TSA and TSFA.65 In Roland v. Green, the victims of a multi-
million dollar Ponzi scheme had purchased certificates of deposit (CDs)
from an offshore bank with assets invested in a diversified portfolio of
marketable securities. 66 The victims brought a class action in federal
court against the bank's insurance brokers for misrepresentations of ma-
terial facts and, along with the bank's lawyers who prevented the SEC
from uncovering the Ponzi scheme, for aiding and abetting, all under the
TSA. The trial court noted that the CDs were not "covered securities"
because they were not registered or traded on a national exchange. 67 In
the absence of any Fifth Circuit precedent, the trial court adopted the
Eleventh Circuit's induced and depend principle, determining that the "in
connection with the purchase or sale of covered securities" requirement
was satisfied and dismissed the victims's TSA lawsuits.68 The CDs backed
by covered securities induced the victims to purchase, and the victims
sold covered securities to raise money for the purchase of CDs. 6 9 The
Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded.70
The Fifth Circuit noted that Congress designed the SLUSA to prevent
states from imposing their litigation costs and risks on nationally traded
securities,7 ' yet preserved state regulation and the right of individuals to
bring suit.7 2 Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has indicated by
its "coincide" requirement for determining "in connection with a covered
security" under the SLUSA that Congress intended a broad interpreta-
tion but not so broad as to include every common law fraud that happens
to involve a covered security.73 With respect to the preclusion issue, the
Fifth Circuit, in a muddled opinion, struggled to determine some rule that
would strike a balance between these two poles. The Fifth Circuit noted
that six of its sister circuit courts had developed rules but rejected five of
these rules as too narrow and incapable of precluding numerous state
class action situations that Congress designed the SLUSA to prevent. 74
state law), a distinction the Fifth Circuit realizes is meaningless. See id. at 520 (replaced by
federal law).
65. See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1)(A) (2012).
66. Roland, 675 F.3d at 503. The victims also brought a claim for civil conspiracy. The
federal courts consolidated these cases with others brought under the Louisiana securities
act. See id. at 509.
67. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b).
68. Roland, 675 F.3d at 510.
69. See Brief of Appellants Samuel Troice, et al. at 3-4, Roland v. Green, 675 F.3d 503
(5th Cir. 2012) (Nos. 11-10932, 11-11031, 11-11048), 2011 WL 6073714.
70. Roland, 675 F.3d at 524.
71. See H.R. REP. No. 105-803, at 1, 15 (1998); 144 CONG. REc. S4,799 (daily ed. May
13, 1998) (statement of Sen. Joe Lieberman); 144 CONG. REc. H10,780 (daily ed. Oct. 13,
1998) (statement of Rep. Anna Eshoo).
72. See S. REP. No. 105-182, at 1, 8 (1998).
73. See SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819-20 (2002).
74. The Eleventh and Second Circuits use an "induced" test, which was rejected here
as too narrow by adding a causation requirement. See Roland, 675 F.3d at 519 (citing Ro-
mano v. Kazacos, 609 F.3d 512, 522 (2d Cir. 2010); Instituto De Prevision Militar v. Merrill
Lynch, 546 F.3d 1340, 1349 (11th Cir. 2008) (adding also a "depend" test)). The Sixth Cir-
cuit uses a "depend on" test, which too was rejected as too narrow. See id. at 513 (citing
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The Fifth Circuit adopted the Ninth Circuit's test requiring the fraud and
sale of covered securities to be more than tangentially related.75 Applying
this test to the sale of the nonregistered CDs by the insurance brokers,
the Fifth Circuit found that the misrepresentation of a backing by covered
securities was only one of eight misrepresentations made and therefore
could not be more than tangentially related.76 Similarly, sales of marketa-
ble securities by some investors to buy the CDs from the insurance bro-
kers were only tangentially related because they could have raised money
by other means.77 With respect to the aiding and abetting of the law firm,
its obstruction fraud also was not more than tangentially related.78
II. THE STATE SECURITIES BOARD'S
ACTIONS AGAINST SCAMS
The TSA created a regulatory body, the State Securities Board
(Board), to handle the registrations required by the TSA, as well as to
serve as an enforcement mechanism. 79 One of the major goals of the
Board is to stop investment scams, including those involving financial
fraud.80
The legislature amended the TSA to increase penalties, especially for
financial fraud on the elderly.81 The legislature's act amended the TSA
section for Board assessment of administrative fines, 82 adding an offense
for intentional or reckless material aiding of a violator, doubling the pen-
alty to $20,000 per violation, and adding an additional penalty of $250,000
if the violator defrauded a person of age sixty-five or older. The act also
amended the TSA section providing for penal sanctions83 to redefine the
penalties to be consistent with the penal code: it replaced the $5,000 fine
Segal v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A., 581 F.3d 305, 310 (6th Cir. 2009)). The Eighth and Seventh
Circuits use the Supreme Court's "coincide" test with no useful explanations, which was
rejected as too narrow. See id at 514 (citing Siepel v. Bank of Am., N.A., 526 F.3d 1122,
1127 (8th Cir. 2008); Gavin v. AT&T Corp., 464 F.3d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 2006) (where the
court applied "involving," but more than "but for")).
75. See Madden v. Cowen & Co., 576 F.3d 957, 966 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Roland,
675 F.3d at 519-20 (adopting the Madden test).
76. Roland, 675 F.3d at 522.
77. Id. at 523.
78. Id. at 511-24.
79. See TEX. REV. CIv. STA-r. ANN. art. 581-1 (West 2012).
80. See, e.g., Press Release, Tex. State Sec. Bd., Inv. Fraud 'Spiraling Out of Control'
and Older Texans Are Favorite Targets, Sec. Comm'r Warns AARP Members (Nov. 30,
2010); Press Release,, Tex. State Sec. Bd., State Sec. Regulators Lead Fight Against Elder
Invest. Fraud and Abuse (June 15, 2010) (launching programs to educate medical profes-
sionals about identifying seniors vulnerable to financial abuse); see also, Press Release,
Tex. State Sec. Bd., Top 10 Investor Traps: How Con Artists Target Investors Rattled by
Econ., Volatile Mkts. (Aug. 23, 2011) (listing various senior fraud schemes, many of which
involve complex investment scams promising inflated returns).
81. See Act of Apr. 27, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 523, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 1298
(amending TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-23-1, 581-29, 581-32 (West 2012)).
82. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-23-1.
83. Id. art. 581-29
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and ten-year sentences with a third-degree felony; 84 it replaced the $5,000
fine and two-year sentences with a state jail felony;85 it extended the of-
fenses to include investment advice; it provided that offenses involving
less than $10,000 were third-degree felonies, offenses involving $10,000 to
$100,000 were second-degree felonies,86 and offenses involving more than
$100,000 were first-degree felonies;87 and it provided for penalty en-
hancement under the penal code for repeat offenders.88 Finally, the act
amended the TSA section for injunctions, restitution, and civil penalties
by adding clarifying language for injunctions during the commission of
the crime, a disgorgement remedy that included profit through subse-
quent sale for any TSA violation, and a $250,000 penalty for elder finan-
cial fraud.89 The fines were increased to enable the Board to protect
investors from Wall Street firms and others who regard the Texas fines as
merely a cost of doing business, to facilitate the Board's enforcement ac-
tions against those not otherwise deterred, and to provide extra protec-
tion for the retirement funds of senior citizens lacking in-home family
members to offer advice or urge caution.90
The legislature also changed the prospective termination date of the
Board from 2013 to 2015 under the Sunset Law91 to help the Sunset Com-
mission by grouping reviews by agency and subject matter.92
III. SECURITIES FRAUD
One of the major reasons legislatures passed securities acts was to facil-
itate investors' actions to recover their moneys through a simplified fraud
action that removed the most difficult elements to prove in a common
law fraud action, namely scienter and privity. These securities acts gener-
ally apply only to the primary market, so when investors purchase in the
secondary market their actions reintroduce these obstacles. Moreover,
Congress added additional burdens to the secondary market securities
fraud action through the PSLRA. 93
84. This provision doubled the dollar penalty. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.34
(West 2012) (stating that a third degree felony penalty includes a fine up to $10,000 and a
jail term between two and ten years).
85. This provision also doubled the dollar penalty. See id. § 12.35 (stating that a state
jail felony penalty includes a fine up to $10,000 and a jail term between 180 days and two
years).
86. See id. § 12.33 (stating that a second degree felony penalty includes a fine up to
$10,000 and a jail term between two and twenty years).
87. See id. § 12.32 (stating that a first degree felony penalty includes a fine up to
$10,000 and a jail term between five and ninety-nine years).
88. See id. § 12.42 (raising the degree of the felony for prior felony convictions).
89. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-32 (West 2012).
90. See House Pensions, Invs., and Fin. Servs. Comm., Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 2342,
82nd Leg., R.S. (2011) (also noting that the legislature last updated civil fines in 1995 and
criminal penalties in 1991).
91. See Act of Apr. 13, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 1232, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 3278
(amending TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-32).
92. See House State Affairs Comm., Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 2249, 82nd Leg., R.S.
(2011) (the House version of the Senate's S.B. 652).
93. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2012).
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A. LEGISLATIVE ACTION TO PROTECT FRAUD VICTIMS
To assist investor fraud actions, the legislature added a new provision
to the TSA to stay enforcement of a foreign country judgment involving a
contract for sale of a security or investment that imposes an indemnifica-
tion or liquidated damage clause on a Texas resident.94 Within thirty days
of attempting to domesticate a foreign country judgment against a Texas
resident, 95 the resident may apply for a stay to allow the Texas court to
determine de novo whether the enforcer of the judgment violated the
TSA or the Deceptive Trade Practices Act.96 The finding of a violation
would provide a court with sufficient grounds for nonrecognition of the
foreign judgment. The reason for the TSA addition is that some invest-
ment scams involve Ponzi schemes operated in foreign countries.97 When
Texas investors have tried to recover their moneys in these foreign coun-
tries, the fraudsters counter-sue them on the basis of an indemnification
clause or liquidated damage clause contained in the sales or investment
contract.
IV. COURT DECISIONS UNDER THE TEXAS ACTS
One appellate opinion involved a number of interesting issues under
both the TSFA and TSA. The case involved a defrauded seller rather
than the more typical defrauded buyer. The appellate court applied gen-
eral fraud principles to the two acts, such as the distinction between opin-
ion and misstatements and the efficacy of releases and disclaimers, while
others related to calculation of damages and the commencement of the
statute of limitations under the TSA. In the opinion, Allen v. Devon En-
ergy Holdings, LLC,98 the greedy investor, upset over surrendering his
interest in an oil and gas LLC through a redemption two years prior (net-
94. See Act of Apr. 19, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 346, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 967 (adding
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33-2).
95. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.001 (West 2012) (Texas version of
the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgment Recognition Act). This act only applies to money
judgments. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Palau, 317 S.W.3d 780, 786 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2010, pet. denied) (refusing to enforce a Mexican divorce decree under the act). Judgments
to enforce indemnity agreements and liquidated damages most likely would be money
judgments.
96. For the applicability of the TDTPA to investment advice, see Flint, supra note 10,
at 1555 n.94.
97. See House Judiciary and Civil Jurisprudence Comm., Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 3174,
82nd Leg., R.S. (2011). The author has been unable to find a single concern for this prob-
lem in the published records of the Texas State Securities Board, the North American
Securities Administrators Association, the SEC, or in state and federal appellate opinions.
The bill could be a disguised special bill, proposed by the Representative from Plano, with
the only hearing witnesses being a Plano ophthalmologist and his lawyer who are suing an
Anguilla LLC and its agents in an oil and gas scam for violations of the TSFA and TDTPA.
See Crithfield v. Boothe, 343 S.W.3d 274, 279-81 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2011, no pet.) (Dr.
William A. Boothe and lawyer Brian Lauten); Second Amended Brief for Appellant at 33
(TSFA by co-plaintiffs), 34 (TDTPA by Boothe), Crithfield v. Booth, 343 S.W.3d 274 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2011, no pet.) (No. 05-10-00789-CV), 2010 WL 4774746.
98. Allen v. Devon Energy Holdings, L.L.C., 367 S.W.3d 355, 365-68 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. granted, judgm't vacated w.r.m.). The investor also alleged
breaches of fiduciary duty and shareholder oppression claims.
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ting $8 million on an investment of $700 plus providing $34,300 as collat-
eral for a loan) and thereby missing a further twenty-fold increase when a
second LLC bought out the first LLC two years after the redemption.
The investor sued the second LLC and the former manager of the first
LLC, a former law partner of the investor, alleging, among other causes
of action, violations of both the TSFA and TSA. The investor based his
securities law claims on nine misstatements made by the former manager
in a letter (received six months before the redemption occurred) 99 con-
cerning the intent to make a redemption offer that allegedly fraudulently
induced the investor to participate in the redemption. The investor be-
lieved that the value had increased by 50% during the redemption's six-
month delay and that the offeror was committing securities fraud by not
updating the value. After a limited discovery, the trial court granted the
second LLC and former manager's summary judgment motion without
specifying any grounds (but the motion did specify three grounds for the
TSFA claim and three for the TSA claim).' 00 The Houston First District
Court of Appeals affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part.' 0
Since the standard to support a defensive summary judgment is that the
movant must negate at least one element of the plaintiff's cause of action
or prove conclusively an affirmative defense for each cause of action,102
the appellate court delved into examining each element and the asserted
affirmative defenses.
A. OPINIONS AND FUTURE EVENT STATEMENTS AS ACTIONABLE
UNDER THE TSFA AND TSA
The first element of a fraud action is an actionable statement of mate-
rial fact. In a lengthy but enlightening section of its opinion, the appellate
court revealed exceptions to generally non-actionable statements. The Al-
len appellate court, citing common law fraud opinions mingled with a few
99. Federal securities laws generally require current (or within a certain period) infor-
mation for the transactions. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (2012) (stating that under Schedule
A, a balance sheet must be provided within ninety days of the filing of the registration
statement); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a) (2011) (stating that a proxy solicitation at the time of
solicitation is required to correct prior misleading communications).
100. Allen, 367 S.W.3d at 366; see also Appellant's Brief at 13, Allen v. Devon Energy
Holdings, L.L.C., 367 S.W.3d 355 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. granted,
judgm't vacated w.r.m.) (No. 01-09-00643-CV), 2009 WL 3847853 (stating that the asserted
claims under the TSA and TSFA are barred because no actionable misrepresentations
were made and there were no recoverable damages; claims under the TSFA are barred by
releases, by absence of justifiable reliance, and by disclaimers of reliance; and claims under
the TSA are barred by investors' knowledge of the misstatements and the statute of
limitations).
101. Allen, 367 S.W.3d at 412.
102. See Cathey v. Booth, 900 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1995).
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TSFA103 and TSA 104 opinions, determined that six of the eight alleged
misstatements were actionable.105 Generally, opinion statements are non-
actionable unless the speaker knows it is false, has superior knowledge
and knows the investor is relying on the speaker's superior knowledge, or
the opinion is so intertwined with other misstatements of fact that the
whole amounts to a false statement of fact. 106 Similarly, opinion state-
ments concerning future events are generally non-actionable unless they
deal with predictions in which the speaker purports to have special
knowledge of facts that will occur or exist in the future, or they promise
future performance and the speaker has no intention of performing (with
the speaker having the burden of proof of the intent to perform).107 The
Allen appellate court found that three of the statements were statements
of fact, while the other three fell within the exceptions for non-actionable
opinion statements: one of which was an opinion so mingled with fact to
be a misrepresented fact, and two dealing with future performance with-
out the speaker's proof of the intent to perform.108
B. PROFIT DISGORGEMENT DAMAGES UNDER THE TSFA AND
INCOME DAMAGES UNDER THE TSA
Another necessary element of a fraud action deals with the presence of
calculable damages. The TSFA provides a remedy for "actual dam-
ages."109 The Allen redemption offeror asserted that these damages for
contractual inducement were too speculative under contract law.110 In the
103. The only difference between the TSFA and common law fraud is that under the
TSFA the investor need not prove scienter (knowledge or recklessness). See In re Enron
Corp. Sec. Derivative & "ERISA" Litig., 623 F. Supp. 2d 798, 807-08 (S.D. Tex. 2009);
Jericho Graphics Corp. v. Haynes, No. 01-03-00987-CV, 2004 WL 2538677, at *3 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 10, 2004, no pet.).
104. See Tex. Capital Sec., Inc. v. Sandefer, 58 S.W.3d 760, 776 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (applying the general opinion rule to dealer puffing under the
TSA); Paull v. Capital Res. Mgmt., Inc., 987 S.W.2d 214, 218-19 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999,
pet. denied) (applying exceptions to the general opinion rule to the TSA, citing common
law fraud cases).
105. Allen, 637 S.W.3d at 376.
106. Id. at 370 (citing Transp. Ins. Co. v. Faircloth, 898 S.W.2d 269, 276-77 (Tex. 1995)
(fraud under Deceptive Trade Practices Act and Insurance Code)).
107. Id. (citing Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng'rs & Contractors, Inc., 960
S.W.2d 41, 48 (Tex. 1998) (common law fraud); Trenholm v. Ratcliff, 646 S.W.2d 927, 930
(Tex. 1983) (common law fraud)).
108. Id. at 369-76.
109. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01(b) (West 2011). Before 1983, the TSFA
provision contained a definition of actual damages: "The measure of actual damages is the
difference between the value of the real estate or stock as represented or promised, and its
actual value in the condition in which it is delivered at the time of the contract." See Act of
1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 949, § 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 5208 (current version at TEX. Bus.
& COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01(b)-(c)) (deleting the definition and adding a section for exem-
plary damages). The deletion clearly indicates legislative desire to expand the types of
damages recoverable as "actual damages." See id.
110. See Reardon v. LightPath Techs., Inc., 183 S.W.3d 429, 441-42 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (rejecting the highest intermediate value theory of dam-
ages for the equitable recessionary remedy in a securities fraud action under the TSA and




absence of a statutory definition of "actual damages," courts have looked
to common law fraud actions for the types of recoverable damages under
the TSFA, which include the equitable remedy of profit disgorgement."'
Therefore, the redemption offeror has yet to foreclose all possible
damages.112
In contrast to the TSFA's actual damages, the TSA specifies damages
for a defrauded seller of a security.113 The redemption offeror claimed
that these damages were limited to the value of the security at the time of
the sale. This position overlooks the addition to that value resulting from
income the buyer received on the shares in the interim. The Allen appel-
late court, however, rejected the greedy investor's contention that "in-
come" under the TSA damage provision included the redemption
offeror's proceeds on a subsequent sale and limited the statutory term
"income" to include dividends and other issuer distributions on the
shares." 4 Once again, the redemption offeror failed to deal with all possi-
ble damages." 5
C. THE IMPACT OF A FRAUD BELIEF ON JUSTIFIABLE RELIANCE
UNDER THE TSFA AND THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
OF KNOWLEDGE UNDER THE TSA
Another necessary element of a TSFA claim, but not a TSA claim, is
justifiable reliance on the misstatement or omission. 116 The Allen re-
demption offeror contended that the investor's reliance was not justified
since the investor believed the value had increased by 50% during the
redemption's six-month delay, and the offeror was committing securities
fraud by not updating the value. Two of the six actionable misstatements
concerned, among other things, the value of the LLC. For that aspect of
the two misstatements, the investor's belief defeated justifiable reli-
ance.117 The investor's belief, however, did not relate to the "future pros-
pects" aspect of those two misstatements, nor to the other four actionable
misstatements, and so it could not defeat justifiable reliance.118
111. See ERI Consulting Eng'rs, Inc. v. Swinnea, 318 S.W.3d 867, 876 n.3 (Tex. 2010)
(lost profits recoverable under both common law and statutory fraud [TSFA]).
112. Allen, 367 S.W.3d at 405-10.
113. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33D, § (4) (West 2011) ("In damages, a
seller shall recover (a) the value of the security at the time of sale plus the amount of any
income the buyer received on the security, less (b) the consideration paid the seller for the
security plus interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of payment to the seller.").
114. Allen, 367 S.W.3d at 410-11.
115. Id.
116. See Coldwell Banker Whiteside Assocs. v. Ryan Equity Partners, Ltd., 181 S.W.3d
879, 888 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.) (real estate statutory fraud); TCA Bldg. Co. v.
Entech, Inc., 86 S.W.3d 667, 674 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, no pet.) (real estate statutory
fraud). The burden of proof for justifiable reliance under the TSFA is less than that for
reasonable reliance under the common law. See In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & "ER-
ISA" Litig., 540 F. Supp. 2d 759, 772 (S.D. Tex. 2007). The TSA does not require reliance.
See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33B; Summers v. WellTech, Inc., 935 S.W.2d 228,
234 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ).
117. Allen, 367 S.W.3d at 387-88.
118. Id. at 386-88.
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In contrast to the TSFA's justifiable reliance requirement, the TSA in-
stead provides an affirmative defense that "the seller knew of the untruth
or omission." 119 The Allen court determined that the investor's belief that
the value was changing and that the offeror was committing fraud had the
same impact under the TSA as the TSFA.120 The knowledge foreclosed a
fraud action on the two value misstatements but had no impact on the
other four misstatements since they did not involve the value.121
D. THE IMPACT OF CONTRACTUAL RELEASES
OF LIABILITY UNDER THE TSFA
One TSFA defense raised by the Allen redemption offeror concerned
the release clauses contained in the redemption agreement-one was a
general release from all liability (except breach of contract) contained in
a Finality Clause, and one was a release relating to any claim arising from
the determination of the value of the redeemed interest contained in an
Independent Investigation Clause. Decisions under the statutory fraud
act for real estate, contained in the same statute as the TSFA, provide
that enforceable releases must "'clearly . . . waive fraudulent inducement
claims' or 'disclaim[] reliance on [the] specific matter[] in dispute." 122
Since the redemption releases did not clearly mention fraudulent induce-
ment claims, this defense could not support summary judgment on the
TSFA claim.123
E. THE IMPACT OF CONTRACTUAL RELIANCE DISCLAIMERS
UNDER THE TSFA
A second TSFA defense of the Allen redemption offeror depicted the
release clauses contained in the redemption agreement as reliance dis-
claimers. Under the TSFA, an investor's disclaimer of reliance might pre-
clude a future claim that the contract was fraudulently induced under a
five-factor test.124 The necessary factor is the presence of a clear and une-
quivocal disclaimer. The Finality Clause failed this test since it made no
reference to reliance or fraudulent inducement, nor did it disavow oral
representations. 1 2 5 The Independent Investigation Clause partially failed
this test.126 This clause implied reliance by inviting the investor to ask
119. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33B.
120. Allen, 367 S.W.3d at 400.
121. Id. at 399-400.
122. Id. at 368 (quoting Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Swanson, 959 S.W.2d 171, 178
(Tex. 1997) (oil and gas)).
123. Id. at 368-69. The Allen court did not address whether the TSA voids the release
clauses with respect to a claim under the TSA. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33L
(provisions waiving compliance with the TSA are void).
124. See Schlumberger Tech Corp., 959 S.W.2d at 179-80 (a clear and unequivocal dis-
claimer), clarified in Forest Oil Corp. v. McAllen, 268 S.W.3d 51, 60 (Tex. 2008) (adding
the following four extrinsic factors: whether (1) the terms were negotiated, (2) the com-
plaining party was representation by counsel, (3) the parties dealt with each other at arm's
length, and (4) the parties were knowledgeable in business matters).
125. Allen, 367 S.W.3d at 379.
126. Id. at 379-80.
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questions and lacked any language that the investor relied exclusively on
his own investigation.12 7 But the clause did satisfy the test for disclaiming
reliance on misrepresentations related to the value of the LLC at the time
of redemption.128 Two of the six actionable misstatements concerned,
among other things, the value of the LLC. For that aspect of the two
misstatements, the Independent Investigation Clause was clear and une-
quivocal.129 The other four actionable misstatements did not concern the
value of the LLC.130
To determine whether the disclaimer of reliance precludes a fraudulent
inducement action under the TSFA for the two value misstatements, the
Allen court investigated the remaining four factors of the five-factor test.
The current case only satisfied two of the remaining factors (representa-
tion by counsel and sophistication in business matters) but not the other
two factors (negotiated terms and dealing at arm's length). Although the
Allen court had previously determined that not all of the factors need to
be satisfied for enforcement of the disclaimer,131 the court of appeals felt
that the two missing factors in the current case mandated non-enforce-
ment of the reliance disclaimer; they both related to an investor's ability
to alter the disclaimer's terms and thereby voluntarily relinquish the
fraud claim.132
One less ingenuous Houston law firm depicts the Allen opinion as
merely a matter of improper drafting on behalf of the redemption of-
feror.133 That firm recommends express disclaimers and express releases
as well as the avoidance of boilerplate looking provisions. Such a sugges-
tion implies that it is legally permissible to commit fraud provided the
fraudster properly gets the victim to disclaim and release all claims. The
Allen court makes it clear that these disclaimers and waivers failed not
only because they were incomplete, but because there was an absence of
arm's-length negotiating ability.134 Similarly, one could expect a subse-
quent court to determine that a properly drafted disclaimer or release
lacked the victim's knowledgeable, voluntary consent when provided.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 380.
129. Id. at 381.
130. Id. at 376-82.
131. Id. at 384 (citing Atl. Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Butler, 137 S.W.3d 199, 216-17 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (settlement agreement disclaimer enforced in
absence of sophistication)).
132. Id. at 382-86.






134. Allen, 367 S.W.3d at 385.
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F. COMMENCEMENT OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
UNDER THE TSA
The third defense raised by the redemption offeror involved the statute
of limitations under the TSA. The TSA requires an investor to bring a
lawsuit within three years of the discovery of fraud or when the discovery
should have been made, or within five years of the sale.'35 The Allen
court used the plain meaning rule to determine that the three year por-
tion of the limitation could begin prior to the sale. 136 In other words, the
limitations period runs from discovery of the fraud, but the investor is
only allowed a potential two-year period to make that discovery, and if
the investor does discover the fraud prior to the sale, the investor pro-
vides the fraudster with knowledge as an affirmative defense. So for the
surviving four misstatements, and the future prospects of the two value
misstatements, the Allen court investigated whether the investor should
have discovered the fraud from Texas Railroad Commission records, a
Morgan-Stanley Barnett Shale report, a Raymond James email, a
Goldman Sachs meeting preview, the DrillingInfo.com website, and news
stories in the Fort Worth Star Telegram. Since the redemption offeror
failed to point out any information in these public records that would
inform the investor of the fraud, the Allen court determined that the of-
feror had not satisfied the limitations defense. 137
V. COURT DECISIONS UNDER THE FEDERAL ACTS
The fraud provisions of the TSA are modeled on the federal statutes.
Therefore, in interpreting the TSA's similar language, Texas courts look
to federal decisions under the federal statutes, and there is an interest in
Fifth Circuit securities law fraud opinions.138
A. RELIANCE IN THE ABSENCE OF NAME ATrRIBUTION
Since the United States Supreme Court does not permit aiding and
abetting lawsuits under Rule lOb-5 to hold secondary individuals lia-
ble,139 aggrieved investors must find such persons liable for primary lia-
bility-that is, claimants must prove all of the elements for a fraud action
under Rule 10b-5.140 The Fifth Circuit in Affco Investments, discussed
135. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33H, § 3 (West 2012).
136. Allen, 367 S.W.3d at 403. The analogous federal statute of limitations is even
clearer, providing a one-year limitation from discovery or when discovery should have
been made, but "[iun no event ... more than three years." 15 U.S.C. § 77m (2012).
137. Allen, 367 S.W.3d at 401-05.
138. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
139. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S.
164, 177-78 (1994); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).
140. The six elements are: "(1) a material misrepresentation or omission ... ; (2) scien-
ter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale
of a security; (4) reliance . . . ; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation." Stoneridge Inv.
Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008); see also George Lee
Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 62 SMU L. REv. 1435, 1458-59 (2009) (discussing Stoner-
idge's impact on Texas decisions).
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above, 141 considered the liability of a law firm described by an accounting
firm in its marketing of a tax shelter as one of several national law firms
that had analyzed and approved the tax strategy.142 The issue for the Fifth
Circuit was whether it could find the law firm primarily liable without
name attribution of its deceptive conduct before the investor invested.
The court observed that the United States Supreme Court rejected
scheme liability for secondary actors because in the absence of knowl-
edge-actual or presumed-of the secondary actor's deceptive acts at the
time of purchase, the investor has no reliance. 143 Hence, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that without explicit attribution the investors had not properly
plead the reliance element of their case.144 The court upheld the dismissal
of the Rule 10b-5 action.145
B. REBUTTING FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET PRESUMPTION
AT CLASS CERTIFICATION
Congress passed the PSLRA146 to discourage extortive securities litiga-
tion. This includes filing class action lawsuits for securities fraud when-
ever a significant change in the issuer's price is followed by abuse of the
discovery process to impose such burdensome costs as to make it more
economical for the victimized issuers to settle.147 Of the funds so extorted
from victimized issuers, 40% to 60% go unclaimed since many small in-
vestors-like the author-are aware that they will receive no more than
pennies on the dollar, and thus fail to file claims, while the extorting law-
yers take up to 35%.148 These lawsuits fail to serve as a deterrent since
managers rarely pay; directors and officers insurance, paid for by current
shareholders, picks up the tab. To lessen the extortive impact of class cer-
tification and to bring the implied cause of action under Rule 10b-5 more
in line with its purpose of protecting investors,149 the Fifth Circuit im-
posed a requirement for class certification of finding "loss causation"
before allowing substitution of fraud-on-the-market theory's rebuttable
141. See supra notes 8-17 and accompanying text.
142. Affco Invs. 2001, L.L.C. v. Proskauer Rose, L.L.P., 625 F.3d 185, 187-89 (5th Cir.
2010).
143. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC, 552 U.S. at 159.
144. Affco Invs. 2001, L.L.C., 625 F.3d at 195.
145. Id.
146. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2012).
147. See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 731. For the fate of one such extorter, see generally PATRICK DILLON &
CARL M. CANNON, CIRCLE OF GREED: THE SPECTACULAR RISE AND FALL OF THE LAW-
YER WHO BROUGHT CORPORATE AMERICA TO ITs KNEEs 451 (2010) (William Shannon
Lerach of the Milberg Weiss law firm was sentenced to two years in jail in 2007 for illegal
payments to plaintiffs and was disbarred in 2009.).
148. See Hal Scott & Leslie N. Silverman, The Alternative to Shareholder Class Actions,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 1, 2012, 5:48 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230381
6504577312373860495762.html.
149. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012) (authorizing SEC fraud rulemaking only for "the public
interest or for the protection of investors").
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presumption for the reliance element in a cause of action. 150
The United States Supreme Court has partially stymied the Fifth Cir-
cuit's approach but has pointed out how to achieve the Fifth Circuit's
desired result. In Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co.,151 the Su-
preme Court reversed a Fifth Circuit opinion interposing the "loss causa-
tion" requirement to deny a class certification. 1 5 2 The lawyer-extorters,
on behalf of their client, went after the issuer under Rule 10b-5153 in a
class action for three alleged misstatements. The elements of a Rule 10b-5
cause of action are: (1) a material misrepresentation (or omission); (2)
scienter; (3) a connection with the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reli-
ance; (5) loss causation; and (6) economic loss.15 4 To form a class, the
court must find the questions of fact to be predominately common
amongst the class members.' 55 In order to avoid placing an insurmounta-
ble evidentiary burden on the client, the fraud-on-the-market presump-
tion (that the available public material information on the issuer
determines the issuer's stock price in the open market on which all inves-
tors rely) satisfies the commonality of the reliance element by creating a
rebuttable presumption upon a showing that the issuer made public mis-
statements, those misstatements were material, the issuer's shares are
traded in an efficient market, and the client traded shares between the
time of the misstatement and the corrective disclosure.' 56 To lessen the
extortive force of class certification, the Fifth Circuit, in the past, has re-
fused to find materiality for the fraud-on-the-market presumption unless
the investors showed the corrective statement adversely impacted the is-
suer's price (that is, loss causation) at the class certification stage.' 57 The
district court found no such impact, denied class certification, and the
Fifth Circuit affirmed.
The Supreme Court, after noting that the other circuits were not as
150. See Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 265 (5th
Cir. 2007); see also George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 61 SMU L. REV. 1107,
1128-29 (2008) (discussing Oscar Private Equity Investments).
151. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2183 (2011).
152. See Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 597 F.3d
330, 335 (5th Cir. 2010); see also George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 64 SMU L.
REV. 535, 550-53 (2011) (discussing Archdiocese of Milwaukee).
153. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).
154. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005).
155. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
156. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-42 (definition), 245 (reason), 248 n.27(elements) (1988); Greenberg v. Crossroads Sys., Inc., 364 F.3d 657, 661 (5th Cir. 2004); see
also George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 58 SMU L. REV. 1135, 1156-57 (2005)(discussing Greenberg).
157. See Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 267 (5th
Cir. 2007); see also Fener v. Operating Eng'rs Const. Indus. and Miscellaneous Pension
Fund (LOCAL 66), 579 F.3d 401, 407 (5th Cir. 2009); Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Flow-
serve Corp., 572 F.3d 221, 228 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc.,
565 F.3d 228, 260-61 (5th Cir. 2009); George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 63 SMU
L. REv. 795, 812-15 (2010) (discussing Fener, Alaska Electrical Pension Fund, and Lor-
mand); Flint, supra note 150, at 1128 (discussing Oscar Private Equity Investments).
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keen as the Fifth Circuit to protect current investors,158 observed that the
fraud-on-the-market theory related to reliance, and the time at which the
investors entered into the securities transaction was when the investor
closed the securities transaction while "loss causation" involved a later
time.159 Hence, to impose a "loss causation" requirement for the rebutta-
ble presumption, replacing reliance, made no sense and was inconsistent
with earlier Supreme Court opinions on the fraud-on-the-market theory.
The lawyer-extorters, however, also requested that the Supreme Court
limit the evidence rebutting the rebuttable presumption to the time of
trial.160 The Supreme Court left that issue open. "To the extent [the is-
suer] preserved any further arguments against class certification," the
Fifth Circuit could address them on remand. 161
The issue of rebutting the presumption at the class certification stage is
presently before the Fifth Circuit, after a cursory remand to the district
court1 6 2 and the district court's certification of the class. 163 The circuits
are split over the issue, with one case presently on appeal to the United
States Supreme Court.164 The Fifth Circuit's case may yet be derailed
over the issue of whether the issuer's submitted evidence related to the
158. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2184 (2011) (noting
that the Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits have rejected the "loss causation" require-
ment); see In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 636-37 (3d Cir. 2011); Schleicher v.
Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 687 (7th Cir. 2010); In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544
F.3d 474, 483 (2d Cir. 2008), abrogated by Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds,
133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013).
159. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2186.
160. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 29-31, Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Hallibur-
ton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011) (No. 09-1403), 2010 WL 2007735 (citing Basic Inc. v. Levin-
son, 485 U.S. 224, 248 n.29 (1988)) (claiming that the Supreme Court's decision authorizing
the fraud-on-the-market theory required such a procedure); see also Transcript of Oral
Argument at 6, Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011) (No. 09-
1403), 2010 WL 2007735, available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argu
menttranscripts/09-1403.pdf (Mr. Boies statement supported by the Basic Inc. footnote,
along with J. Alito's observation that the footnote is dicta made at a time when the courts
allowed conditional classes).
161. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2187.
162. See Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 647 F.3d
533 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (reversing the district court and remanding).
163. See Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., No. 3:02-
CV-1152-M, 2012 WL 565997, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 2012) (also denying the issuer any
ability to supplement the record as untimely, despite using an incorrect principle when
making that record), affd sub nom. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 718 F.3d
423 (5th Cir. 2013).
164. See In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 638 (3d Cir. 2011) ("[W]e believe
rebuttal of the presumption of reliance falls within the ambit of issues that, if relevant,
should be addressed by district courts at the class certification stage."); In re Salomon Ana-
lyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d 474, 484 (2d Cir. 2008) ("[Issuers are] allowed to rebut the
presumption, prior to class certification, by showing, for example, the absence of a price
impact. . . ."); contra Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds v. Amgen Inc., 660 F.3d 1170, 1177
(9th Cir. 2011) ("[W]e hold that plaintiffs need not prove materiality to avail themselves of
the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance at the class certification stage."), affd,
133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013); Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2010) ("Defendants
say that, before certifying a class, a court must determine whether false statements materi-
ally affected the price. But whether statements were false, or whether the effects were
large enough to be called material, are questions on the merits.").
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time of securities transaction or whether the issuer preserved the rebuttal
ability.165 Therefore, the Supreme Court may settle the issue before the
Fifth Circuit acts on the key issue.
VI. CONCLUSION
During this Survey period, Texas courts after Affco Investments began
to consider whether equity interests in LLCs are subject to the TSA and
TSFA. These courts also dealt with several cases involving summary judg-
ments obtained by aiders and abettors. They generally found fact issues
to preserve the fraud lawsuits, fortunately rejecting the attempt in High-
land Capital Management to convert the TSA's objective awareness to
subjective awareness, and the ridiculous non-control claims of an officer
in Darocy; but in Fernea, the court of appeals disturbingly allowed con-
trol liability for an employee's acts outside of employment. In Roland, the
Fifth Circuit joined the Ninth Circuit in imposing a "more than tangen-
tially related" test before applying the SLUSA preclusion of state securi-
ties laws. A Texas court in Allen determined that the TSA's statute of
limitations may start before the transaction occurs and that damages do
not include subsequent profit made by the fraudster.
The Fifth Circuit is still engaged in its campaign to protect investors
from extortive lawsuits, failing in its attempt in Erica P. John Fund to
impose "loss causation" at the class certification stage but possibly pre-
serving the ability to rebut the fraud-on-the-market presumption at that
time. The problem is that the federal securities statutes are for the protec-
tion of all investors, while the courts have interpreted the implied Rule
10b-5 action to compensate only a limited class of investors. The result is
the transfer of wealth from one group of investors to another group with
a substantial amount going to the latter group's greedy lawyers. The focus
of Securities Acts should be similar to that of Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act (ERISA) plans. 166 How should one member, here an
165. Compare Defendants' Petition for Permission to Appeal the District Court's Janu-
ary 27, 2012 Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion to Certify Class at 14, Erica P. John Fund,
Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (June 6, 2011) (No. 09-1403), 2012 WL 560072
(discussing the district court's failure to address the issue of rebuttal when issuer presented
ample evidence that the alleged misrepresentation did not distort the price), with Plaintiffs'
Response to Defendants' Petition for Permission to Appeal the District Court's January
27, 2012 Order Granting Lead Plaintiff's Motion to Certify Class at 14, Erica P. John Fund,
Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (June 6, 2011) (No. 09-1403), 2012 WL 560989
("Defendants have provided no reasonable explanation for their failure to introduce rebut-
tal evidence and make rebuttal arguments, at least as an alternative basis for opposing class
certification . . . ."); see also Motion to Leave to Appeal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f) at 3,
Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. (N.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 2012) (No. 12-90007) (Den-
nis, J., dissenting) ("Although this argument has been available ... the defendants chose
not to raise it before the district court when the class certification proceedings were being
held in this case .... ).
166. ERISA similarly has a provision that the plan be operated for the benefit of all
employees. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (2012) (also referred to as ERISA
§ 404(a)(1)(A)); 26 U.S.C. § 401(a) (2012) (providing introductory language). There are no
extracontractual damages paid from the plan, see Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473
U.S. 134, 144 (1985), and for insurance protection of fiduciaries, not bought by the plan,
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investor, be compensated when that compensation reduces the wealth of
other investors, namely those investors remaining with the issuer or
newly invested? The focus should also be on deterring the aberrant be-
havior of some members of management. Hence, rather than steal from
the remaining investors to compensate the lucky investors and their law-
yers, the court should force the culpable members of management to
forgo a portion of their wealth.
recourse must be allowed against the fiduciary for breach of fiduciary duty. See 29 U.S.C.§ 1110 (also referred to as ERISA § 410(a)-(b)).
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